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Germany in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict:  
a political or a humanitarian mission?
Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, Kamil Frymark
Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, profound changes in Germany’s thinking 
about Russia, its political elite and foreign policy, can be observed. The trust most German po-
liticians had in their former strategic partner has now lessened. At the same time, Germany has 
been particularly involved in the process of resolving the conflict, which was demonstrated by 
the intensive diplomatic actions it undertook. When these failed, Chancellor Angela Merkel did 
not hesitate to force through the introduction and maintenance of economic sanctions. At the 
same time, however, this evolution in Germany’s thinking about Russia has not translated into 
any change in the two basic assumptions of the German attitude towards a possible solution to 
the conflict. First, Germany supports the concept of ‘strategic patience’ in politics in the context 
of Russia’s aggression. Second, it is convinced that Europe is fated to cooperate with the Russian 
Federation, and Europe’s welfare and security are only possible with Russia as a partner in co-
operation, not against it or without it. Therefore, in the immediate future no radical change in 
Germany’s policy as pursued so far should be expected. This provokes questions concerning not 
only the effectiveness of Berlin’s current actions, but also – in a broader sense – Germany’s abi-
lity to negotiate and achieve real, political solutions to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, reaching 
beyond (another) ceasefire. The Minsk agreements of 12 February can be considered a success 
worthy of a humanitarian mission carried out in the hope of reducing the number of casualties. 
However, the political mission undertaken by Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier 
aimed at “ensuring Europe’s security order”1 has so far resulted in the sense of helplessness and 
frustration which have recently dominated Germany’s policy towards Russia2.
The German diplomatic offensive12
For Germany, the Ukrainian-Russian conflict is 
tantamount to the violation of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of one of Europe’s states, 
and its possible escalation is seen as a prelude 
to another armed conflict in Europe. Therefore, 
1 Merkel emphasised the goal of solving the Rus-
sian-Ukrainian conflict during the press conference with 
President Barack Obama on 9 February 2015. Cf. http://
www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Presse-
konferenzen/2015/02/2015-02-09-merkel-obama.html
2 For more on this topic, see Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, 
‘Germany on Russia. Yes to links, no to rapprochement’, 
OSW Point of View, February 2014.
Berlin has been treating the mission to find 
a solution to this conflict as the most prominent 
challenge in its foreign policy since Germany’s re-
unification. In the opinion of German politicians, 
the only possible method of solving the conflict 
is the doctrine of ‘strategic patience’3, which 
provides for the lasting and consistent pursuit of 
3 The concept of ‘strategic patience’ in foreign policy was men-
tioned by Chancellor Merkel and other politicians at the Mu-
nich Security Conference on 7 February 2015. Germany has 
also been using this argument in relation to the fall of the Ber-
lin Wall and Germany’s reunification, for example in the con-
text of the 25th anniversary of the reunification. http://www.
bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferen-
zen/2015/02/2015-02-09-merkel-obama.html 
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one’s policy, even if it brings frequent failures. 
The immediate cause of the German-French ini-
tiative launched during the visits by Chancellor 
Merkel and President Hollande to Kyiv (on 5 Feb-
ruary) and Moscow (on 6 February), which were 
aimed at achieving a ceasefire and defining the 
conditions for its observance, was the escalation 
of military actions in the Donbas. The debate on 
the legitimacy of NATO states possibly supplying 
weapons to Ukraine has also played an import-
ant role, as such a move could cause deep divi-
sions between the USA and Germany. The sense 
of the failure of the diplomatic actions carried 
out so far was also important; Minister Steinmei-
er has repeatedly mentioned his disappointment 
at the lack of progress in the negotiations4.
Meeting  with President Putin in Moscow, Chancel-
lor Merkel changed her initial position. Previously, 
she had called for clear progress in de-escalating 
the conflict as a precondition to meet Russia’s 
president in the so-called Normandy format (such 
a meeting was originally planned to take place in 
Astana in mid-January)5. Moreover, she withdrew 
from opposing the meeting in Moscow (which 
had long been called for by some German politi-
cians and experts)6. However, due to the renewed 
offensive by Russian-backed rebels launched in 
mid-January, and the growing number of casual-
4 For example, Steinmeier mentioned this in the context of 
preparations for the summit in Astana and during the Munich 
Security Conference. Cf. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/
Europa/Aktuell/150119-BM-RfAB.html; Rede von Außenmin-
ister Steinmeier bei der Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz 2015 
[Speech by Foreign Minister Steinmeier at the 2015 Munich Se-
curity Conference], http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infos-
ervice/Presse/Reden/2015/150208_BM_M%C3%BCSiKo.html
5 The so-called Normandy format involves meetings of repre-
sentatives of Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia (at vari-
ous levels). The name relates to the first meeting between 
Chancellor Merkel and the Presidents of France, Ukraine 
and Russia in June 2014 during the celebrations of the 70th 
anniversary of the Normandy landings. Among the major 
preliminary conditions for organising a Normandy-format 
meeting in Astana, Germany listed the withdrawal of heavy 
equipment from the regions covered by the fighting in east-
ern Ukraine, and an exchange of prisoners of war. Cf. http://
www.president.gov.ua/en//news/32071.html
6 Cf. Stefan Meister, ‘Putin richtig verstehen’ [To understand 
Putin right], https://dgap.org/de/think-tank/publikationen/
dgapstandpunkt/putin-richtig-verstehen, ‘Linke: Merkel 
soll nach Moskau fahren’ [The Left: Merkel should trav-
el to Moscow], http://www.neues-deutschland.de/ar-
tikel/926826.linke-merkel-soll-nach-moskau-fahren.html
ties in Donetsk and Mariupol, Chancellor Merkel 
decided to become personally involved in the 
negotiation process and bring about a cease-
fire. This decision was also influenced by the 
debate currently under way in the USA concern-
ing the possible supply of weapons to Ukraine. 
Chancellor Merkel strongly opposed this possi-
bility (for example, she spoke about this at the 
Munich Security Conference), seeing it as posing 
a risk of escalating the conflict. Her consent to the 
meeting in Minsk was also motivated by the fail-
ure of German diplomatic actions, mainly carried 
out to date by Minister Steinmeier. Since the be-
ginning of the crisis Germany tried to secure the 
signing of a binding agreement on ceasefire. This 
was the concept behind the Minsk deals signed on 
5 September 2014 and the protocol signed on 19 
September 2014. For Germany, these documents 
formed the basis for further political negotiations, 
and Chancellor Merkel made the possible lifting of 
the sanctions imposed on Russia conditional on 
their provisions being fully respected. 
The deal reached in Minsk on 12 February 2015 
to resolve the conflict in the Donbas opened 
the way to a ceasefire, but at the same time im-
posed more obligations on Ukraine than on the 
separatists. Additionally, Russia may use this 
deal as a basis for blaming Ukraine for not re-
specting its provisions, while its full observance 
may lead to the legitimisation of the separat-
ists. At the same time, the deal does not allow 
Russia to implement its strategic goals towards 
Ukraine, which may suggest that the document 
For Germany, the Ukrainian-Russian con-
flict is tantamount to a violation of the sov-
ereignty and integrity of one of Europe’s 
states, and its possible escalation is seen 
as a prelude to another armed conflict in 
Europe. Berlin has been treating the mis-
sion to find a solution to this conflict as 
the most prominent challenge in its for-
eign policy since Germany’s reunification.
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will likely only contribute to a temporary de-es-
calation of the conflict7. Even a fragmentary 
solution such as this one has been enough to 
allow Germany and France to save face. More-
over, some elements of public opinion in Eu-
rope even considered it proof of Germany hav-
ing passed a specific kind of leadership test.
Russia – a strategic challenge 
In spite of the efforts to achieve a binding politi-
cal agreement and to solve the conflict by diplo-
matic means, i.e. by carrying out a ‘political mis-
sion’, Germany has been confronted with Russia’s 
unwillingness to cooperate. As a consequence, 
it has continued to limit its goals to finally fac-
ing the situation in which the political mission 
becomes a de facto ‘humanitarian mission’ with 
a limited goal: to suspend military actions and 
halt the rise in the number of casualties. 
In a broader context, reaching beyond the pres-
ent conflict, Germany has treated Russia as 
a state with immense potential for destruction. 
At the same time, Berlin is convinced that what-
ever happens, Russia will remain the EU’s most 
important neighbour and that European secu-
rity can only be built “with Russia, not against 
it”8. Germany also excludes the neutral option of 
building up security “next to Russia”. Moreover, 
it sees Russia as an important partner without 
which it would be impossible to solve many in-
ternational crises (such as the crisis over the Ira-
nian nuclear programme or the conflict in Syria). 
Therefore, voices calling for the need to apply 
a dual strategy towards Russia are being heard 
ever more frequently in Germany. This dual strat-
egy is the so-called congagement, a combination 
7 After Szymon Kardaś, Wojciech Konończuk, ‘Minsk 2 
– a fragile truce’, OSW Analyses, 12 February 2015, 
8 This provision was included in the coalition agreement of 
the current government, composed of representatives of the 
CDU, CSU and SPD parties, ‘Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten’ 
[Shaping Germany’s future], 16 December 2013. The issue of 
building security in Europe with Russia was also mentioned 
by Chancellor Merkel during the Security Conference in Mu-
nich on 7 February 2015. Cf. http://www.bundesregierung.
de/Content/DE/Rede/2015/02/2015-02-07-merkel-sicherhe-
itskonferenz.html
of the policy of containment and that of engage-
ment9. This assumption has become the basis 
for continued offers of cooperation extended 
to Russia (including reviving the Partnership for 
Modernisation10 and signing a free trade agree-
ment between the EU and the Eurasian Union11). 
These offers have been presented to Russia not 
only by Germany’s top Social-Democratic pol-
iticians, but also by Christian Democrats with 
Chancellor Merkel as their leader. At the same 
time, during the NATO summit in Newport on 
4–5 September 2014, Germany approved the 
strengthening of NATO’s eastern flank. In 2014 
Germany took part in increased NATO activities 
in the Baltic states, Poland and Romania. Berlin 
also agreed to cooperate with Poland and Den-
9 Wolfgang Ischinger, ‘Eine Aufgabe für Generationen. Der 
Westen muss gegenüber Russland auf eine neue Doppelstrat-
egie setzen’ [A task for generations. The West needs to adopt 
a new dual strategy towards Russia], Internationale Politik 1, 
January/February 2015, p. 30-35; Ischinger, Germany’s for-
mer ambassador to the USA and the United Kingdom, and 
Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, can serve as an 
example of Germany’s evolution of views on Russia. At the be-
ginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict he strongly opposed 
any decisive approach to Russia and reiterated part of the Rus-
sian narrative concerning the West’s mistakes, cf. http://www.
tagesschau.de/ausland/runder-tisch104.html However, in the 
debate on possible weapons supplies to Ukraine launched in 
January 2015, he did not rule out such an option. Cf. ‘Pledge 
weapons for Ukraine or the violence will go on’.
10 This was mentioned by Vice-Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) 
in an interview for the Handelsblatt daily, 20 January 2015, 
http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Presse/reden,did=682552.html
11 However, this format of cooperation would be asymmetrical, 
and would not lead to any change in Russia’s policy (as it would 
continue to pursue its current goals within the Eurasian Union), 
forcing the other Eurasian Union states to unconditionally sup-
port the Kremlin’s position. Moreover, representing other coun-
tries within an international organisation would enable Russia 
to position itself as a mediator in the internal conflict in Ukraine, 
and not as one of its actors. Cf. Adam Eberhardt, ‘Dialogue with 
the Eurasian Union on Ukraine – an opportunity or a trap?’, 
OSW Commentary, 1 December 2014. 
Germany has been repeatedly confronted 
with Russia’s unwillingness to cooper-
ate. As a consequence, it has continued 
to limit its goals, to finally face a situation 
in which the political mission has become 
a de facto ’humanitarian mission’.
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mark on improving the readiness of the Multi-
national Corps Northeast in Szczecin. According 
to announcements, in 2015 German soldiers will 
participate in exercises organised in Poland and 
the Baltic states as part of an increased rotating 
military presence on NATO’s eastern flank12.
During the Russian-Ukrainian conflict the Ger-
man government has gradually increased its 
criticism of Russia, and in the EU forum Berlin 
has accepted the task of creating and imple-
menting a policy supported by the 28 EU states 
(including stepping up the sanctions, some-
times against the position of some EU states, 
for example after the shooting down of the Ma-
laysian passenger plane). Germany’s assuming 
the role of a creator of the EU’s policy towards 
the conflict in Ukraine has partly been forced 
on Berlin, but it has also partly been a conse-
quence of the ambitions pursued by Germany 
as a leader in the EU. This results both from 
Germany’s leading role in the EU, its economic 
power and traditional ties with Russia, and the 
weakness of the remaining EU actors. What is 
particularly evident is the inertia of the EU insti-
tutions, which at best are serving as ‘secretarial 
offices’ supporting Germany’s actions, as well 
as the weakness of individual states: France (due 
to its economic problems) and the United King-
dom (which has been distancing itself from the 
EU). Also President Barack Obama, nearing the 
12 In 2014 Germany participated in the Standing NATO Mine 
Countermeasures Group 1 (SNMCMG1) operating on the 
Baltic Sea, in NATO’s additional AWACS radio-electronic 
reconnaissance flights over Poland and Romania and in 
the air policing mission over the Baltic states. Cf. Justyna 
Gotkowska, ‘A weak link? Germany in the Euro-Atlantic 
security system’, OSW Point of View, January 2015.
end of his second term in office, is unwilling to 
get involved in the conflict in Europe, although 
during Chancellor Merkel’s visit to Washington 
both Obama and Merkel tried to confirm the 
West’s unity on the matter, even when facing 
“differences in the respective countries’ posi-
tions” concerning possible support for Ukraine. 
Divisions within society
The policy of Angela Merkel’s government to-
wards the Russian-Ukrainian conflict enjoys the 
support of a large portion of German society. 
In spite of a drop in Germany’s exports to Rus-
sia (by 18% in 2014 compared with the previous 
year)13, economic circles have also accepted the 
primacy of politics over the economy, and are 
following the sanctions imposed on Moscow. 
Among other factors, this results from Germa-
ny’s good economic results in 2014 and from 
the conviction that Russia’s actions are desta-
bilising conditions for doing business, and are 
thus threatening German economic interests.
The high public support for the government’s 
actions results, among other factors, from 
Chancellor Merkel’s ability to balance and com-
bine the often conflicting lines of German polit-
ical and public debates, and apply compromise 
solutions in her everyday government routine. 
It seems that Germany’s mood continues to be 
determined by two major approaches to Rus-
sia. On the one hand, there is still a numerous 
group of proponents of Ostpolitik14, who sup-
13 After: The Committee on Eastern European Economic Re-
lations (Ost-Ausschuss), ‘Exporte nach Russland um sechs 
Milliarden Euro gesunken’ [Exports to Russia dropped by 
six billion euros], http://www.ost-ausschuss.de/node/791
14 According to this group, Russia is perceived as the European 
Union’s key geopolitical partner with which cooperation is 
necessary to create a stable European security order. They 
see a strategic partnership with Russia, even at the price of 
concessions, as a condition for stability in Europe, especially 
in the context of security challenges in the post-Soviet area 
which is considered Russia’s natural ‘zone of influence’. For 
this type of cooperation with Russia to become fact, it is nec-
essary to build an institutional framework for political and 
economic relations, both bilaterally and between the EU and 
Russia. Cf. Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, Konrad Popławski, 
‘The German reaction to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict 
– shock and disbelief’, OSW Commentary, 3 April 2014. 
Germany has treated Russia as a state with 
immense potential for destruction. At the 
same time, Berlin is convinced that Russia 
will remain the EU’s most important neigh-
bour and that European security can only 
be built “with Russia, not against it”.
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port the idea of meeting Russia’s demands and 
treat sanctions as an inefficient element of the 
USA’s fight with Russia. On the other hand, var-
ious groups are disappointed at the lack of re-
sults from the policy pursued so far of making 
repeated offers of rapprochement with Rus-
sia in Europe. From the beginning of the Rus-
sian-Ukrainian conflict, the group of so-called 
Russlandversteher (or ‘those who understand 
Russia’) has weakened considerably, and more 
and more actors admit that Russia is not a reli-
able partner for Germany. 
In a public debate currently under way in Ger-
many concerning the approaches to the Rus-
sian-Ukrainian conflict, the lines of division be-
tween the various positions do not run clearly 
along the lines of party membership. Admittedly, 
there is a consensus that the initiative undertak-
en by Germany and France was right, although 
regarding the possible supply of weapons or 
possible solutions to the conflict in Ukraine, 
opinions vary. One section of the elite claims that 
rejecting the possibility of supplying weapons to 
Ukraine is a strategic mistake in the negotiations 
with Russia (this view has been expressed for ex-
ample by Marieluise Beck from Alliance 90/the 
Greens and Michael Gahler from the CDU), while 
the other believes that Ukraine should adopt 
a binding commitment to give up its plan to join 
NATO (the Left). Similar divisions have been evi-
dent in the context of the sanctions: 45% of CDU/
CSU supporters consider them a proper reaction 
to Russia’s actions, while another 45% think oth-
erwise. In the group of Social Democrats sup-
porters, the sanctions are approved of by 55%, 
and 41% believe that they should be lifted. In 
both cases the coalition parties need to over-
come another obstacle which makes their sharp 
anti-Russian rhetoric unfavourable to them. On 
the right side of the political stage, the Euroscep-
tic Alternative for Germany (AfD) is trying to win 
over the disappointed CDU/CSU electorate by us-
ing pro-Russian slogans, whereas on the left side 
of the political stage, strong pro-Russian views 
are promoted by the post-Communist Left.
Despite this, most Germans support the EU’s 
sanctions against Russia (65% of those surveyed 
in an opinion poll conducted in February 2015 for 
the Infratest dimap centre) and would welcome 
a more decisive reaction by the EU to Russia’s 
actions than that displayed so far (55%). At the 
same time, 70% of society fears an escalation of 
the conflict between Russia and the West, 48% 
of whom understand that Russia may feel threat-
ened by the West. Moreover, 69% of Germans 
oppose NATO’s permanent presence in Eastern 
Europe, and 78% of the respondents claim that 
Russia is a partner which cannot be trusted. 
Summary: A humanitarian mission 
instead of a diplomatic one
Due to its involvement in resolving the conflict 
with Russia, Germany has strengthened its leader-
ship within the European Union. Public debate is 
practically free of opinions questioning Germany’s 
legitimacy to conduct negotiations on behalf of 
the EU, and Berlin has played a key role in these 
talks (although it is aware of the risk of losing its 
credibility, should the talks fail). This is not only be-
cause President Putin does not want to talk to any 
other country on resolving the conflict, but also 
because a large portion of EU states, as well as the 
USA, are willing to entrust Germany with this task. 
It seems that with this level of support German 
diplomacy could achieve considerable progress in 
the talks with Russia. However, there have been 
Germany’s assumption of the role of cre-
ator of EU policy towards the conflict in 
Ukraine has partly been forced upon it, and 
has also partly been a consequence of the 
ambitions it has pursued as a leader in the 
EU. This has been a consequence of Ger-
many’s leading role in the EU, its economic 
power and traditional ties with Russia, and 
the weakness of the remaining EU actors.
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numerous strategic limitations in Germany’s policy 
towards Russia’s aggression in Ukraine15. Current-
ly, by giving in to Russia’s blackmail, its ‘arguments 
of power’ and ‘unpredictability’ has been its most 
important limitation. This was demonstrated 
by the radical change in Chancellor Merkel’s at-
titude and her consent to repeated negotiations 
in Minsk. It was the escalation of military actions 
by the separatists and the large number of casual-
ties that convinced Chancellor Merkel to travel to 
Moscow and negotiate the proposals submitted 
by President Putin. Previously, she had strongly 
opposed this plan. Moreover, both the German 
Foreign Minister and Chancellor Merkel herself 
immediately ruled out the possibility of supply-
ing weapons to Ukraine, which deprived them of 
a strong argument in their negotiations with Rus-
sia. Moscow, on the other hand, has repeatedly 
tried to convince the West that it will only yield 
to pressure (for example, from the EU’s joint eco-
nomic sanctions). By pursuing this policy Germa-
ny has been reiterating Russia’s narrative in which 
a solution to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict could 
only be achieved by implementing either of two 
15 Cf. J.Gotkowska, ‘A weak link?’, op. cit. The author lists sev-
eral major limitations to Germany’s foreign policy towards 
Russia, including historical reasons (memory of the defeat 
on the Eastern front, the Soviet occupation and the division 
of Germany, as well as the fact of considering Russians, and 
not Ukrainians or Belarusians, as the main victims of Nazi 
Germany, excluding Jews); Germany’s perception of the 
USA not as a guarantor of security in Europe, but as a state 
which could destabilise this security (for example by using 
military arguments); and the growing economic and po-
litical focus on emerging powers, which could lead to the 
weakening of trans-Atlantic ties.
mutually exclusive scenarios: one being diplomacy 
and political solutions, and the other involving the 
supply of weapons to Ukraine. An option combin-
ing diplomatic actions with a demonstration of 
military potential is to be available only to one side 
– Russia. If applied by the West, this option would 
mean an ‘escalation of the conflict’.
The question arises of whether Germany, having 
assumed responsibility for conducting negotia-
tions in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, is still car-
rying out a diplomatic mission aimed at achieving 
a political agreement with Russia (not involving 
Ukraine’s surrender), or whether it is carrying out 
a humanitarian mission only. The reason for the 
latter would be to maintain peace and stability in 
the region and – more importantly – avoid further 
casualties, which at the same time would mean 
giving up hope of a real political solution to the cri-
sis in the region in the immediate future. It should 
be hoped that the German government is aware 
that the conflict with Russia is in effect a conflict 
over the shape of the international order, reaching 
far beyond the war in the Donbas and even be-
yond the conflict between Russia and Ukraine16.
16 Cf. Chancellor Merkel’s statement during a debate at the 
Australian think tank Lowy Institute for International Pol-
icy on 17 November 2014: “The Ukrainian crisis is not just 
a regional matter – it concerns us all”. The Chancellor add-
ed that “it is not only about Ukraine, but also about Moldo-
va and Georgia. Are we expected to ask [Russia’s – editor’s 
note] consent [for EU enlargement – editor’s note] in the 
presence of Serbia? In the presence of the Western Bal-
kans? This would be against our values.” Cf. http://www.
bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekon-
ferenzen/2014/11/2014-11-17-diskussion-lowy.html
